EVALUATING A VECTOR OF THE FED'S FORECASTS
This paper evaluates two key sets of forecasts, the ten components of US real GDP and three major macroeconomic indicators, prepared by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Most evaluations have used a univariate methodology that separately examined the Fed's forecasts of select variables such as GDP, inflation, and unemployment. (Clements et al., 2007; Joutz and Stekler, 2000; Romer and Romer, 2000; Sims, 2002; and Stekler, 1994.) There have, however, been a small number studies that have considered some multivariate characteristics of the Fed's forecasts. Sinclair, Stekler and Kitzinger (SSK, 2010) examined the joint directional forecasts of GDP and inflation using contingency tables. Sinclair, Gamber, Stekler, and Reid (SGSR, 2012) calculated the costs of jointly misestimating GDP and inflation within the context of a Taylor type rule. These studies, however, did not develop a general approach for jointly evaluating quantitative forecasts.
Focusing on the rationalizability of the forecasts, Caunedo et al (2013) jointly test the rationality of the Federal Reserve's forecasts of inflation, unemployment, and output growth.
They use the methodology of Komunjer and Owyang (2012) where forecast errors in a multivariate framework are used to derive the weights of a utility function. Their approach differs from the one that we present below. Our method focuses on forecast comparison rather than on rationalizability.
This paper will examine two topics that have not been addressed before. The first, an evaluation of the Fed's forecasts of the components of real GDP, has not been performed before using either the univariate or multivariate approaches. Past evaluations of the Fed's real GDP growth rate forecasts have only focused on the headline GDP projections, and, to the best of our knowledge, the Fed's forecast of the ten main components of GDP have never been evaluated.
The second topic involves a multivariate analysis of the Fed's forecasts of growth, inflation, and unemployment. We undertake this multivariate analysis because these forecasts are produced and used jointly. This approach enables us to determine whether the Fed's forecasts provided an accurate comprehensive view of the various sectors of the economy. This view is especially important if the forecast is used in making policy and suggests that the forecasts should be evaluated jointly in a multivariate framework. We next present the rationale for this approach.
Consider a large database of forecasts prepared by a number of individuals/organizations.
The database would likely consist of forecasts made for a number of variables over a number of horizons over a period of time. How should one evaluate these forecasts? There is not a simple answer because there are a number of ways of doing this analysis. They range from the simple univariate single horizon method to the more complex methods which aggregate across the various dimensions of the data.
The database of forecasts in general will have four dimensions: (1) the number of variables (J) that are predicted, (2) the number of horizons/periods (H) for which each variable is predicted, (3) the number of times (T) that the predictions are made, and (4) the number of forecasters (N). On the other hand, Clements, Joutz, and Stekler (2007) and Lahiri (1995, 1999) The rest of the paper proceeds in this way: We first describe the data and the new methodology and then evaluate the Fed's forecasts of ten major expenditure categories of GDP.
As a second example, we also conduct a multivariate analysis of the forecasts of three variables, the GDP growth rate, the rate of inflation, and the unemployment rate, that together describe the overall condition of the economy. Finally, using the same methodology, we compare the Fed's forecasts of those three variables with the median predictions of the same variables obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
I. Data
The projections used in this analysis are the Federal Reserve's Greenbook forecasts for (1) the growth rates of the ten major components of GDP that the Fed staff predicted from 1986.3 through 2004.4, 5 and (2) the growth rates of real output, the inflation rate, and the unemployment 6 rate for the period 1965. 4 -2005.4. 6 In each quarter the Fed staff makes multiple predictions for many quarters into the future. We use the last set of forecasts made in each quarter and analyze the projections that are made for the current quarter and one quarter ahead.
We focus on short horizons because the Fed staff has, at times, based its Greenbook forecasts on an assumed (possibly varying) path for monetary policy. At other times, however, the Fed has assumed that monetary policy would remain unchanged over its forecast horizon (see Reifschneider and Tulip, 2007 , for further discussion). Since the assumed path for monetary policy associated with each Greenbook forecast is not known, a possible complication arises when analyzing longer-term forecasts. The current quarter and one-quarter ahead forecasts are too short of a time horizon, however, to be affected by the Fed's future path for monetary policy.
Therefore, regardless of whether the Fed assumes a constant path or a time-varying path for monetary policy, the current and one-quarter-ahead forecasts will be unaffected by those assumptions.
The actual values were the real-time data published approximately 90 days after the end of the quarter to which they refer. The use of the real-time data avoids definitional and classification changes.
II. Methodology

A. Single Variable Analysis
We first analyze the forecast errors of each variable separately and focus on two topics: directional accuracy and systematic error.
Directional Accuracy 7
A desirable characteristic of any forecast is that it should provide a correct picture of the direction in which the economy is moving. Thus the signs of the predicted changes of each of the ten components will be compared with the sign of the actual changes reported 90 days after the end of the quarter to which they refer.
Systematic Error (Bias)
Even if there are not a substantial number of differences in signs between the forecast and actual changes, there may still be a systematic error-a bias. We use two approaches to determine whether the forecasts are systematically related to the actual data. First, we test this relationship using the Mincer-Zarnowitz (1969) regression. We then question whether there are systematic errors related to the state of the economy. These two tests are applied individually to each of the ten components of GDP. 7 Customarily, the Mincer-Zarnowitz (1969) regression has been used to test for bias in the forecasts of a single variable: Recent research has shown that forecasts sometimes contain systematic errors Stekler, 2000, Hanson and Whitehorn, 2006) . Forecasters overestimated the rate of growth during slowdowns and recessions and underestimated it during recoveries and booms. Similarly, inflation was under-predicted when it was rising and over-predicted when it was declining. In 7 These tests for the growth rate and inflation forecasts were already done in Sinclair, Joutz, and Stekler (2010) . We therefore do not replicate them here. 8 An alternative procedure for testing for bias has been to use equation suggested by Holden and Peel (1990) :
In this case, the slope is imposed to be one and the test examines whether or not the forecast error has a zero mean, i.e. a simple test of statistical significance of the constant in this equation. 8 some cases, these systematic errors, associated with the stages of the business cycle, may offset each other. Consequently, the use of (1) in the presence of these offsetting errors may yield regression estimates that do not reject the null of bias when in fact there are systematic errors that are associated with the state of the economy.
In order to determine whether the Fed's forecasts similarly failed to incorporate information about the state of the economy, we modified (1) as in Sinclair, Joutz, and Stekler (2010) . The modified Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (2) now becomes:
where D t is a dummy that reflects the state of the economy. It takes on the value 1 if during one month of a particular quarter the economy was in a recession. Otherwise, the value of the dummy is zero. The quarters that constituted the recession were those defined by the NBER. 
In this case, is then a vector of the constant terms and is a matrix of coefficients on the lags of the forecast errors. Under the null hypothesis, all of the elements of both and are zero. In section IV below we also undertake a multivariate analysis of the forecasts of growth, inflation and unemployment to determine whether these predictions accurately capture the overall view of the economy.
Accuracy
As mentioned above, we use a distance measure to determine the accuracy or difference of the vectors. There are two common measures of distance, Euclidean and Mahalanobis, that differ in the assumptions made about the statistical independence of the vectors Assume that we have two independent vectors, F t and A t , representing the forecasts and outcomes consisting of n variables in each vector. The difference between the two vectors can be measured by the Euclidean distance between them:
This procedure is only applicable to vectors that are independent and that are scaled so that they have unit variances. These assumptions do not apply in this analysis. Thus, we will use a generalization of the Euclidian distance that allows for the scale to differ across the different 10 variables and for nonzero correlation between the variables. In order to test if there is a difference between the forecasts and the outcomes, we will focus on the difference between the mean vectors of each set of data relative to the common within-group variation. This measure is called the Mahalanobis Distance, D 2 :
where W is the inverse of the pooled sample variance-covariance matrix, and � and � are the mean vectors of the forecasts and outcomes, respectively. 11 We can then construct an F-statistic based on this measure to test the null hypothesis that the forecasts and outcomes have the same population means.
12
In addition, we will split the sample into periods when the economy was expanding and when the economy was in recession. From this we can see if the difference between the forecasts of the ten GDP components and their outcomes is significant during expansions, during recessions, or in both cyclical phases.
III. Results
A. Directional Accuracy
Among the 10 major components, the sign of the change in consumption services was always positive in both the forecasts and the actual data. The accuracy of the current quarter forecasts of the direction of change of the remaining nine GDP components ranged from 79-89%;
10 Mahalanobis distance is also associated with discriminant analysis. For other economic forecast applications of this measure, see Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) and Jordá et al (2010) . 11 We estimate the sample covariance matrix as the weighted average of the two (bias-corrected) sample covariance matrices from the two sets of data. It is assumed that the two sets of data have a common covariance matrix in the population. it was 68-83% for the t+1 predictions. 13 (See Table 1 ). The quarter-ahead forecasts displayed a clustering of incorrect signs during the recession of 2001; otherwise there was no obvious clustering.
B. Bias
Tables 2A and 2B present the results from the tests that we used to determine whether the forecasts of the ten components were biased. We show the p-values obtained from the two
Mincer-Zarnowitz equations and from the joint test using the 11-equation VAR. 14 We found that at least one of the tests found evidence of bias in six of the component current-quarter forecasts and in nine of the one quarter-ahead projections. Thus in the 1986-2004 period, not only is the headline GDP forecast biased but so are many of the estimated components.
C. Accuracy
Despite the evidence of these biases in the forecasts, we needed to determine whether the forecasts of the ten components, taken together, provided an overall view of the growth of the economy that was consistent with the condition that actually occurred. For this analysis, we used the Mahalanobis Distance measure to jointly evaluate the component forecasts. The null was that the Fed forecasts failed to provide an overall view of the growth of the various sectors of the economy that was consistent with the observed data. (Tables 3A-3C ). We did not reject the null for the current quarter forecasts in either the entire sample or in the recession/expansion subsamples. However, the null was rejected for the quarter-ahead forecasts for both the entire sample and for expansionary periods. The p values of the F statistics were 0.05 and 0.02, respectively. These results indicate that the Fed had a good understanding of the composition of 12 the GDP changes that were occurring in the current quarter but not how these sectors were likely to change next period.
D. Comparison with BEA Results
It is possible to make a benchmark comparison of these component forecasts. The
Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes estimates of all of these components 30 days after the quarter to which they refer. Since the Fed's current quarter forecasts were made during the quarter, they were available at least 30 days before the BEA's first estimates. Sinclair and Stekler (2011) examined the 30 day vintage of BEA's estimates of the GDP components. They found that at least one test rejected the null of no bias in the BEA estimates for every single variable, be it headline GDP or one of the components. While none of the tests rejected the null for the Fed's forecast of four components, the earlier results are basically comparable to the ones that we now present. 16 Thus the Fed's forecasts made in the current quarter seem to be as good as the BEA's estimates released at least 30 days later.
IV. Overall View of the Economy
A good forecast should provide an accurate picture or overall view of the state of the economy at a particular point in time. We have, so far, focused on the GDP and component forecasts, but the Fed also projects the inflation rate and the unemployment rate at the same time that it predicts headline GDP. A combination of these three individual forecasts can be viewed as a vector representing an overall view of the future condition of the economy. The actual outcomes of the three variables comprise a different vector. Thus, if we are concerned with how well the forecasts reflect the actual changes that have occurred in the economy, we must compare 15 The null was not rejected in the recessionary quarters. This may be due either to a better understanding of what can occur in recessions or to the fact that the number of observations was too small to be able to reject the hypothesis. 16 The components were consumption services, fixed non-residential investment, and the two government sectors.
(See Table 2A .) It should be noted that the time periods for the two studies were different.
the difference in the two vectors, representing the forecasts and the actual outcomes of the three variables.
Our methodology permits us to analyze this issue, and we again used the Mahalanobis Distance measure, this time to jointly evaluate the growth, unemployment, and inflation forecasts.
The null was that the Fed forecasts provide an overall view of the economy that was consistent with the observed data. We did not reject this null for either the current or the quarterahead forecasts. We obtained the same results when we divided the sample into expansionary and recessionary periods. The p-values of the F statistic associated with the Mahalanobis Distance measure were always greater than 0.40. (Tables 4A-4C) From these results we can conclude that the Greenbook forecasts are consistent with the overall conditions that actually occurred. However, given the results obtained from the ten component projections, the quarter-ahead estimates made for particular sectors may not always reflect actuality.
V. Benchmark Comparison
Our analysis to this point has been exclusively on the Fed's forecasts. This raises an obvious question: In terms of an overall view of the economy, how do these forecasts compare with other predictions? As the benchmark for this comparison, we used the median forecasts of growth, inflation and unemployment obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
Beginning in 1968.4, these forecasts span a period nearly as long as the entire sample of the Fed's predictions.
The comparison is based on data for forecasts made from 1968.4 through 2005.4. As before we construct two vectors from the predictions of these three variables and use the Mahalanobis Distance measure to determine whether there was a significant difference in the 14 average overall views of these two sets of forecasts. The results are presented in Table 5 and show that there is little difference between the two sets of forecasts.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we evaluated two key sets of the Fed's Greenbook forecasts. We argued that a macro forecast is intended to provide an overall view of the economy and it is, therefore, necessary that the forecasts of all important variables should be evaluated jointly in a multivariate framework. We then showed how a new approach for evaluating economic forecasts permitted us to evaluate the predictions of several variables jointly. We first applied this approach to the Fed's forecasts of the growth rates of ten components of real GDP. We showed that the Fed had a good understanding of the composition of the GDP changes that were occurring in the current quarter but not how these sectors were likely to change next period.
Moreover, the Fed's forecasts for the current quarter were comparable in quality to the BEA estimates published at least 30 days after the quarter ended.
We then used the same method to examine the Fed's Greenbook forecasts of growth, inflation and unemployment to determine whether together they presented a substantially correct view of the state of the economy. We found that the Fed's forecasts were generally consistent with the overall conditions that actually occurred. We also compared the Fed's forecasts to those of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and found that there was not a significant difference in the quality of the forecasts. 
